Search Results for 'Behavior and Philosophy'


Group: Philosophy/History
The philosophy and history section is devoted to the philosophical, historical, metaphysical, and methodological foundations of the study of behavior, brain, and mind. Here you will find articles from our flagship journal Behavior and Philosophy, as well…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 43, 1-37 (2015). ANTIDUALISM…
ABSTRACT: Radical behaviorism (RB) is antidualistic and antimentalistic. Antidualism is the rejection of ontological dualism, the partition of reality into physical and nonphysical. Antimentalism is the rejection of the ontological theses that mind is ca…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 43, 62-84 (2015). MENTALISTI…
ABSTRACT: In this paper we analyze autism as a hypothetical construct and explain how an Autism Spectrum Disorder diagnosis functions to derail scientific investigations of autistic behavior. To support this argument, we employ a series of behavioral p…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 43, 86-103 (2015). GOOGLE AN…
ABSTRACT: I argue that groups of people (not just individuals) can literally perform mental act such as strategizing and deciding. I do this by, first, explicating what it is for an entity to have mental states and perform mental acts. I then show how cer…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 42, 1-26 (2014). CAN WE RESP…
ABSTRACT: I critically review Bruce N. Waller's Against Moral Responsibility (2011), in which he argues that the moral responsibility system can and ought to be abandoned and that it be replaced with a take-charge responsibility system. Taking the perspec…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 42, 27-36 (2014). THE SCIENT…
ABSTRACT: In Against Moral Responsibility, the rejection of moral responsibility is based on appeal to basic beliefs about fairness (beliefs that are widely shared and naturally explicable, but not subject to rational or scientific confirmation). However,…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 42, 37-64 (2014). ARE NEUROR…
ABSTRACT: Are the available conceptual foundations, the statistical techniques, and the empirical data of cognitive neuroscience sufficiently robust to serve as foundations for an overarching neuroreductionist explanation of the mind-brain relationship? T…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 42, 65-82 (2014). ON DEFININ…
ABSTRACT: This paper attempts to suggest some conceptual preliminaries to a definition of behavior. I begin by distinguishing some different senses of the notion, with emphasis upon that of behavior as the occurrence of an organism's action or reaction. S…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 42, 83-115 (2014). PROPOSITI…
ABSTRACT: A formal symbolic language for behavioral operations is proposed, based on propositional logic. The system describes how an experiment changes an organism's physical environment. With few exceptions, the codification system results in statements…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 41, 1-10 (2013). WE ARE ALL …
ABSTRACT: Methodological and radical behaviorisms have been contrasted not only with respect to their consideration, or lack thereof, of private psychological events, but also with respect to their criteria for scientificity. Skinner (1945), in particula…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 41, 11-32 (2013). NON-HUMEAN…
ABSTRACT: Behavior analysis exemplifies a highly peculiar type of explanation in which behavior is said to arise from past interactions with the environment rather than from internal mental states. Radical behaviorism has been advanced as a philosophy of …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 41, 33-59 (2013). FILLING TH…
ABSTRACT: It is often said, especially in philosophy and the neuroscience literature, that Skinner defended an anti-physiological position on the explanation of behavior. Aside from this, behavior analysts who discuss the relation between behavior analysi…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 41, 60-69 (2013). CULTURAL C…
ABSTRACT: This article discusses experimental studies on cultural selection as well as some of their findings on the function of programmed events as cultural consequences. I argue first, that the experimental preparations developed in this context have b…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 41, 70-75 (2013). WHY I AM N…
ABSTRACT: Watson set the initial parameters for a science of behavior. The experimental analysis of behavior as developed by Skinner still has much work to do before claiming to be the science of behavior. The cultural environment has been shaping the be…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 1-16 (2011). A BEHAVI…
ABSTRACT: In Feelings: The Perception of Self, Laird deftly synthesizes decades of research supporting the self-perception theory of emotion and feeling, providing an account of these phenomenon that is compatible with radical behaviorism. Beginning with …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 17-43 (2011/2012). A …
At present there is no explanation for the mind/brain relationship; it is hard to conceive mentalistic explanations in terms of mechanistic explanations, where mechanistic explanations refer to explanations common in the sciences such as neurophysiologica…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 69-81 (2011). THE BRO…
The transparency of qualia to introspection has been given as reason for favoring a representationalist view of phenomenal character. Qualia realists, notably Block (1996, 2000), A.D. Smith (2008), and Kind (2003, 2008), have denied that qualia are transp…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 83-87 (2011/2012). ME…
ABSTRACT: I argue in opposition to Sam Rakover that the current lack of fully adequate theories of the subjective and qualitative aspects of mind does not justify the adoption of what he calls "methodological dualism" (Rakover, this issue). Scientific und…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 89-92 (2011/2012). CO…
ABSTRACT: Rakover argues that both mechanistic and mentalistic accounts are needed to explain behavior, and his position is based mainly on the fact that physical and mentalistic accounts have existed throughout recorded history, yet all attempts to recon…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 93-102 (2011/2012). M…
ABSTRACT: Rakover has thought about the nature of explanation for a long time and he has written some insightful pieces on the possibility of incorporating mentalistic language into serious explanations of our activities. Here he takes an extreme tack and…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 103-105 (2011/2012). …
ABSTRACT: In contrast to Rakover's approach, I argue that intentional and extensional accounts of behavior are incommensurable, that the former are necessary only when the capacity of the latter to explain behavior cannot be empirically sustained, and tha…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 107-125 (2011/2012). …
ABSTRACT: First I comment on the reasons that motivated me to develop the approach of Methodological Dualism (MD) and Multi-Explanation Framework (MEF) and present a brief summary of its main ideas; second, I respond to the commentators' criticisms; fin…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 127-144 (2011/2012). …
Memes, defined in terms of ideas, mental representations or information, are used in an attempt to explain the spread of cultural practices. We argue that such reference to hidden replicators, which are said to have causal effects on a person
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy. 39/40. 145-202 (2011/2012). …
ABSTRACT: Methodological behaviorism is a stance on verbal processes and the meaning of "psychological" terms and concepts that are deployed in theories and explanations of behavior. According to this stance, all such terms and concepts should be based on…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 303-307 (2011/2012). …
ABSTRACT: This commentary on the development of CyberRat points out that 1) CyberRat is an excellent educational alternative to a live rat in cases where instruction of basic operant conditioning principles cannot be carried out with live animals due to a…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 309-313 (2011/2012). …
ABSTRACT: The extent to which a virtual "CyberRat" is a valid stand-in for a live, behaving rat is addressed in terms of various versions of a Turing test. The CyberRat program, for the most part, is a valid substitute for a living, behaving subject as a …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 315-319 (2011/2012). …
ABSTRACT: While the CyberRat simulation described by Ray (2011/2012) has considerable value as an educational tool, its value also lies in the validation of the descriptive interbehavioral systems analysis (IBSA) approach upon which it was developed. The …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 321-329 (2011/2012). …
ABSTRACT: Invited reviewer comments by Iverson (2011/2012), by Lewon, Munoz Blanco, and Hayes (2011/2012), and by Phelps (2011/2012) are reflected upon within the context of my own perceptions of selective strengths and weaknesses of my
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 345-353 (2011/2012). …
Chemero, Anthony. (2009). Radical embodied cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: A Bradford Book, MIT Press. Students of psychology are taught to regard the Representational Theory of Mind as a relatively new invention, attached to the rise of modern compute…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 1-29 (2010). IS NEUROSCI…
The widespread use of brain imaging techniques encourages conceiving of neuroscience as the forthcoming "mindscience". Perhaps surprisingly for many, this conclusion is still largely unwarranted. The present paper surveys various shortcomings of neuroscie…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 31-48 (2010). MORALITY:…
Half a century ago, Elizabeth Anscombe reminded us that we of the West think of morality as a kind of law-viz., a moral law. As originally conceived, this law consisted of heavenly commands delivered to a favored clan and known only by the privileged few …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 49-59 (2010). IS JUSTIFI…
Edmund Gettier (1963) argued against defining knowledge as justified true belief. Using two examples, he demonstrated that (a) believing a proposition to be true, (b) having justification for that belief, and (c) the proposition in fact being true, do not…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 61-81 (2010). REPLY TO C…
Six of the seven commentaries expressed basic agreement with our characterization of dispositioning as a typically unacknowledged, pervasive, and often problematic explanatory practice. One of these (Glenn) situated our own interpretive activity within th…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 83-101 (2010). MAN AS MA…
Some years ago I was pleased to attend a colloquium at my university presented by the first author, the psychologist Randy Gallistel. After describing some behavioral studies with rats, he concluded that the animals had counted their responses. Following …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 103-111 (2010). RESPONSE…
I thank Donahoe for a thoughtful and thorough review that fairly describes the book’s core arguments. Donahoe's criticisms and comments provide an opportunity to amplify on some of our key arguments in ways that I hope will contribute to a fuller unders…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 113-115 (2010). PREFACE …
The European Journal of Behavior Analysis and Behavior and Philosophy are pleased to jointly recognize the contributions of Dr. Murray Sidman to the discipline of behavior analysis. From 1976 to 1981, the journal then titled Behaviorism, now Behavior and…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 117-119 (2010). REMARKS.…
In order to stimulate informal discussion of behaviorism among the readership, we have invited Murray Sidman to let us have his comments on the current scene as a regular feature of this journal. He has accepted. The following remarks constitute the body …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 121-123 (2010). REMARKS.…
I have often wondered if others share my conviction that errorless learning proves the learning process to be all-or-none rather than continuous. Perhaps everybody already knows this, or perhaps it is obviously wrong. Either alternative would explain why …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 125-127 (2010). REMARKS.…
I occasionally announce to students that the first obligation of any good behaviorist is to conform to the laws of behavior. After all, if behaviorists flouted the laws of behavior why should anyone else obey them, and where would our Science be then? The…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 129-132 (2010). REMARKS.…
To the extent that behavior is governed by reinforcement contingencies, we may agree with B.F. Skinner that operant behavior is essentially the field of purpose. I should like to take another step and suggest that behavior under stimulus control is essent…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 133-136 (2010). REMARKS.…
I suggested last time that cognition and stimulus control are essentially the same field, that the analytic units appropriate to a science of knowing should be the same units with which we analyze relations between behavior and its controlling environment…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 137-139 (2010). REMARKS.…
I am always somewhat disconcerted when colleagues, telling me about their research, describe the experimental design before acquainting me with the problem the experiment is addressing. They seem not to recognize that an experimental design is empty until…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 141-144 (2010). REMARKS …
In Tactics of Scientific Research (Sidman, 1960/1988) I expressed my opinion that most philosophers of science know little or nothing about how scientific research is actually carried out. It appeared to me that the philosophy and the tactics of science h…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 145-148 (2010). MURRAY S…
I have always thought of Sidman's classic text, known affectionately as Tactics (1960), as primarily a philosophy of science text. I was surprised to learn that Sidman himself did not see it as particularly relevant to the philosophy of science (Sidman 20…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 149-151 (2010). SIDMAN O…
There is no way to overstate the importance of Murray Sidman's contributions to applied behavior analysis. This series of Remarks represents just a few of those. I'd like to take this opportunity to restate some of Sidman’s (1977) comments on aversive c…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 153-155 (2010). STIMULUS…
I had the pleasure of talking with Murray Sidman at a conference not too long ago. I had something important to tell him. "Murray," I said, "I have been studying your work for nearly 30 years, and I've found something that you wrote that was wrong." "On…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 157-160 (2010). COMMENTS…
As a graduate student working in Murray Sidman's group at the Shriver Center when his Remarks series came out, I recall clearly reading each one as it appeared and discussing the series with my advisor, Larry Stoddard. I recall just as clearly my question…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 161-163 (2010). STIMULUS…
You are at a dinner table with unknown people, and you say to the person sitting across from you "Pass the salt, please"; with no hesitation the person passes the salt, and you say ―Thank you.‖ You come with your dog to a street corner and say "sit"; …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 165-168 (2010). EXPANDIN…
"[R]esearch reports. . .in applied behaviour analysis seem to emphasize experimental design at the expense of the study's substantive aims. It is sometimes difficult to brush away the uncomfortable impression that design is becoming an end in itself, that…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 169-171 (2010). THE SCIE…
The core analytic unit in any evolutionary perspective is variation and selective retention. Behavior analysis has always been part of the community of evolution sciences, but in some ways it is the most thorough going because it is most willing to consid…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 173-177 (2010). COMMENTS…
I am deeply honored by the invitation to comment on Murray Sidman's Remarks (Sidman, 1976, 1977a, 1977b, 1978, 1979, 1981, 2011). At the same time, I have to agree with Sidman's own comments in one of those remarks: "It is difficult to add anything cogent…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 179-197 (2010). REPLY TO…
I was surprised and to a considerable extent pleased that Per Holth and Jay Moore, two behavior analysts for whom I have the greatest respect, thought that my six Remarks columns, published back in the late 1970s and early 1980s, were still sufficiently s…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 1-2 (2009). INTRODUCTIO…
This special section gathers five target papers on the issue of covert behavior and private events in radical behaviorism, plus one commentary of the papers.
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 3-19 (2009). THE ROLE O…
Like most other sciences, behavior analysis adopts an assumption of uniformity, namely that principles discovered under controlled conditions apply outside the laboratory as well. Since the boundary between public and private depends on the vantage point …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 21-37 (2009). WHY THE RA…
For radical behaviorists, talk about "private events" could be about any of four things: (a) private behavioral events, (b) physiology, (c) dispositions, or (d) explanatory fictions. Talk about private events as behavioral engages the influence of feeling…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 39-57 (2009). OVERCOMIN…
Radical behaviorism is distinguished from other varieties of behaviorism in part by its willingness to include private events among its subjects of analysis. This paper reviews the public-private dichotomy as described by Skinner, and concludes that this …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 59-85 (2009). AGAINST PA…
This paper is a rejection of parsimonious behaviorism (PB). PB was proposed by Stemmer (2003) to avoid certain problems with radical behaviorism's (RB) appeal to covert behavior to account for mental phenomena. According to Stemmer, covert behavior was no…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 87-104 (2009). INTENTIO…
Discrepancies between animal and human responding on standard schedules of reinforcement have been explained by reference to the human capacity for language and consequent formulation of self-instructions. As a result, schedule responding has been causall…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 105-117 (2009). PRIVATE …
What are "private events" and what is their significance? The term is B. F. Skinner's, but the idea is much older. Before J. B. Watson challenged their methods and their metaphysics, virtually all psychologists assumed that the only way to discover a pers…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 119-125 (2009). WHY DIS…
This commentary discusses the major claims and arguments presented by Field and Hineline (2008) against the general use of dispositional causal explanations in science and psychology and in favor of an alternative account that applies to cases in which ca…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 127-133 (2009). PRAGMATI…
I am in agreement with Field and Hineline's excellent essay (2008) concerning the limitations of cause-effect explanation and the derivative problems with person-centered accounts of human action. However, their account is simultaneously limited by its co…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 135-140 (2009). DISPOSIT…
Field and Hineline use the term dispositioning to refer to the tendency to privilege spatially and temporally local entities in psychological explanation. In our commentary we offer reasons for agreeing with their claim that dispositioning is overly preva…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 141-147 (2009). BEYOND …
Field and Hineline (2008) develop a full-scale account of the conditions under which speakers in our culture-in the vernacular as well as in the more technical parlance of psychological theory-explain behavior by appealing to contiguous events or, in thei…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 149-150 (2009). ON EXPLA…
Field and Hineline (2008) offer a sympathetic explanation for the resistance of psychologists and philosophers to explaining behavior as temporally organized phenomena occurring as a function of other events, also often distributed over time. This resista…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 151-155 (2009). HOW SHA…
Field and Hineline have shown how pervasive and insidious is the tendency to make dispositional attributions, even among those who criticize the practice, and they identify a bias for models of contiguous causation as one reason for this tendency. They ar…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 157-163 (2009). "BEHAVI…
Behavior analysis ironically appears to be increasingly at risk for abandoning its historic focus of moment-to-moment behaving, to other disciplines ranging from robotics and the "man-machine interface" to cognitive science where behaving is called "actio…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 165-180 (2009). NATURALI…
In an earlier essay in this journal, the estimable John Staddon charges B. F. Skinner and E. O. Wilson with committing several fallacies while promoting evolutionary ethics. The present essay replies that what Staddon regards as fallacies are signal contr…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 181-185 (2009). FAITH A…
Professor Hocutt and I agree that David Hume first pointed out that "ought"-what should be done-cannot be derived from "is"-what is the case. Hocutt goes on to claim that "ought," in fact, derives from factual observation of "what we care about," which am…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 187-194 (2009). VALUES: …
In his spirited "Faith and Goodness" (this issue), John Staddon says that my defense of B. F. Skinner's definition of the good-as what has the potential to reinforce desire for it-overlooks the fact that people sometimes desire the wrong things. Staddon a…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 195-216 (2009). MORAL AG…
Arguably, one of the most exciting recent advances in moral philosophy is the ongoing scientific naturalization of normative ethics and metaethics, in particular moral psychology. A relatively neglected area in these improvements that is centrally importa…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 217-222 (2009). ASCRIBI…
Much of the commentary on my paper "Intentional behaviorism" (Foxall, 2007) fails to make contact with my central arguments about the use of intentional language in the explanation of behavior. Marr's (2008) remarks on my responses to that commentary (Fox…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 1-4 (2008). PETER HARZEM…
Peter was a wonderful human being who showed us through his intelligence, scholarship, wit, and honesty that psychology has a long way to go. All of us will miss him in this journey.
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 5-69 (2008). DISPOSITION…
"Now" is privileged in most psychological theories, which portray their processes as proceeding from moment-to-moment. As in any science, this adherence to contiguous causation hinders an account of phenomena that involve remote events or temporally ex…
  Page: 1/10   Next Page
Copyright ©1997-2017 by the Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies. All rights reserved.

The text of this website is available for modification and reuse under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 3.0 Unported License and the GNU Free Documentation License.

Что выбрать? Онлайн или реальные слоты? Как обыграть казино?